have naturally a multi-layer system architecture with an overlaid or underlaid device network and its coexisting infrastructure network. The connectivity between different components in these two heterogeneous networks plays an important role in ensuring a high-level situational awareness. However, IoTenabled infrastructures face cyber threats due to the wireless nature of communications. Therefore, maintaining the network connectivity in the presence of adversaries is a critical task for the infrastructure network operators. In this paper, we establish a three-player three-stage game-theoretic framework including two network operators and one attacker to capture the secure design of multi-layer infrastructure networks by allocating limited resources. We use subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the strategies of players with sequential moves. In addition, we assess the efficiency of the equilibrium network by comparing with its team optimal solution counterparts in which two network operators can coordinate. We further design a scalable algorithm to guide the construction of the equilibrium IoT-enabled infrastructure networks. Finally, we use case studies on the emerging paradigm of Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) to corroborate the obtained results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) technologies are widely adopted in various application domains especially in the infrastructures including smart grids, smart homes, intelligent transportations and smart cities [1] . With the current information and communication techniques (ICTs), an IoT-enabled infrastructure network has its own networking platform that is interoperable within the existing Internet infrastructure. Hence, an IoTenabled infrastructure can be naturally viewed as a two-layer network consisting of the infrastructure layer network and the overlaid or underlaid device layer network. The connections in the two-layer network architecture can be classified into two types: (i) the interlinks by which devices/infrastructures communicate between themselves as well as (ii) the intralinks by which devices communicate with the infrastructure.
Note that devices can communicate with each other or with infrastructures to maintain a global situational awareness of the network. The IoT devices which are scarce of on-board computational resources can outsource heavy computations to the data centers through cloud computing infrastructure [2] , [3] . IoT-enabled infrastructures are often vulnerable to attacks which can degrade the system performance, since most of the communications within the IoT networks are wireless in nature.
Therefore, to protect the IoT-enabled infrastructure from adversarial behaviors, it is imperative to design secure and robust two-layer networks that can maintain connectivity despite of link failures. Due to the heterogeneous and two-layer feature of the network, the design of the network is decentralized essentially. Specifically, the network design involves two players who design their own subnetworks sequentially. The objectives of these two network operators are to maintain the connectivity of the global network, while an attacker aims to disconnect the network at the minimum cost.
In this paper, we use a three-player three-stage game to capture the secure sequential IoT-enabled infrastructure network design. At the first stage, the network operator 1 creates links by anticipating the behavior of the network operator 2 and the adversary. At the second stage, the network operator 2 observes the links created by operator 1 and forms links to secure the network by anticipating the adversarial behaviors. Finally, the adversary observes the whole network created by the two operators and launches an attack targeting to disconnect the network. The two operators have aligned objectives to make the two-layer network connected. However, they have different costs or capabilities in forming communication links.
We adopt subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) as the solution concept to the three-player sequential IoT-enabled infrastructure network design game. We first observe that the SPE of the game results in a k-connected graph if the network remains connected at equilibrium. To understand the efficiency of the Nash equilibrium network, we use a centralized network design problem as a benchmark in which both operators coordinate and design an optimal secure network as a team. We further observe that the price of anarchy (PoA) is unbounded in general cases. However, when two subnetworks contain the same number of nodes and the unitary cost of creating intralinks is the same as that of forming interlinks of player 1, then the PoA is 2, which means that the maximum loss of efficiency through decentralized network design is 50%. Finally, we use case studies on Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) to illustrate the design principles of secure multi-layer infrastructure networks. With a higher threat level, the two network operators prefer more collaborations to secure the IoBT network.
Related Works: Security is a critical concern for IoT-enabled infrastructures [3] , [4] . Our approach is related to the recent advances in research on network formation [5] , adversarial networks [6] , [7] , and network games [8] , [9] . In particular, we address a heterogeneous multi-layer network design problem and apply the framework to smart infrastructure networks.
Some proofs in the paper are omitted due to page limit. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the multi-layer IoT-enabled infrastructures framework and formulates the problem. Equilibrium infrastructure network analysis are presented in Section III. Section IV designs an algorithm to guide the secure solution network construction. Case studies on IoBT networks are provided in Section V, and Section VI concludes this paper.
II. MULTI-LAYER IOT-ENABLED INFRASTRUCTURE MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider 2 infrastructure network operators and two sets of nodes N 1 and N 2 , where nodes represent the devices and infrastructures in the IoT-enabled network. The first operator controls nodes in N 1 and as such can create wireless communication links between those nodes as well as links connecting a node in N 1 to one in N 2 . Similarly, the second operator controls nodes in N 2 and can create links except those in N 1 . For convenience, we define the following notations:
• E 1 is the set of possible links between nodes of N 1 , that is
• E 1,2 is the set of possible links between nodes of N 1 and
The adversarial IoT-enabled infrastructure network formation consists of three stages which are as follows.
• At round 1, operator 1 has the choice of creating a set of communication links in E 1 ∪ E 1,2 .
• At round 2, operator 2 can create a set of communication links in E 2 ∪ E 1,2 .
• At round 3, an adversary can remove a set of communication links, e.g., through jamming attacks, that have been created during the previous two rounds. A network is a pair (N , E ), with N a set of nodes and E a set of edges, or links between two nodes. At round 1, starting from an empty network (N , / 0), with N = N 1 ∪ N 2 , operator 1 creates a set
of links and thus designs network G 1 = (N , E 1 ) such that E 1 is a subset of E 1 ∪ E 1,2 , the set of admissible links for operator 1, i.e., E 1 1 ⊆ E 1 and E 
The goal of the operators is to construct a connected IoTenabled infrastructure network, that is a network where every node can be reached from any others through a sequence of links. Conversely, the role of the adversary is to obtain a disconnected infrastructure network, and thus a node or a group of nodes becomes not accessible to the rest of the network. Let 1 G be the indicator factor that equals 1 if network G is connected and 0 otherwise.
Both creating and removing links is costly. Let c 1 and c 2 be the unitary costs for creating a link for operators 1 and 2 in E 1 and E 2 , respectively, and c 1,2 and c 2,1 be their corresponding unitary costs for creating a link in E 1,2 . In addition, c A is the cost of the adversary to compromise a link. Then, the payoffs of operators 1, 2 and the adversary are, respectively,
where | ⋅ | denotes the cardinality of a set.
In this work, we are interested in seeking the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) of the game, that is, we seek for optimal strategies of the three players as follows.
• Given network G 2 , the adversary chooses the optimal set
By convention, the adversary attacks the network when c A |E A | = 1 and 1 (N ,E 1 ∪E 2 ∖E A ) = 0 at SPE. In contrast, the operators will not secure the network if
2 | = 1, and 1 (N ,E 1 ∪E 2 ∖E A ) = 1. Therefore, the SPE yields the equilibrium topology of the two-layer adversarial IoT-enabled infrastructure networks.
III. SPE ANALYSIS AND ANALYTICAL RESULTS
In this section, we analyze the formulated three-player threestage IoT-enabled infrastructure network formation game in Section II with a focus on its SPE.
A. Backward Induction
To derive the SPE, we proceed by backward induction, that is we compute first the optimal strategy for the adversary, then operator 2 and finally operator 1.
We denote by p-connected a network G = (N , E ) that remains connected after the deletion of any p links and such that there exists a set F of p + 1 links (|F | = p + 1) so that the network (N , E ∖F ) is disconnected. Any connected network G = (N , E ) is a p-connected network for some value of 1 ≤ p ≤ |E |. By convention, we say that a non-connected network is (−1)-connected. The value p is called the link connectivity of the network. We say that a network is presistant if it remains connected after the deletion of p links, that is, if it is m-connected for some m ≥ p.
In the following, we let k = ⌊1/c A ⌋. Lemma 1. Let E 1 and E 2 be played by operator 1 and 2 respectively. Then, the adversary's optimal strategy E MAX A is:
Proof. Note that since 1 − 1 (N ,E 1 ∪E 2 ) ∈ {0, 1} then the utility of the adversary is upper bounded by 1.
which is thus the (only) optimal strategy.
Assume now that
Thus, the optimal strategy of the adversary is not the empty set if and only if there exists an
Let m be the connectivity of network (N ,
Thus this strategy is strictly dominated by the null strategy and therefore is not optimal. Reciprocally, let F be such that (N ,
Thus, the null strategy is optimal if and only if k ≤ 1/c A < m + 1, and a non-null strategy is optimal if and only
Thus, k can be interpreted as the maximum number of links that the adversary may attack at the SPE. In a similar vein, we can now detail the optimal strategy of operator 2:
Lemma 2. Let E 1 be played by operator 1. Then, the operator 2's optimal strategy E MAX 2 in the IoT-enabled infrastructure is: This result leads us finally to the optimal strategy for operator 1 in the IoT-enabled infrastructure networks: 
is not empty, we consider its element F that has the minimal cost, that is the set of links
In the following, we denote the SPE in the following format:
the strategy of the first operator, E 2 2 ∪ E 2,1 2 the strategy of operator 2, and E the strategy of the adversary (with
2 ). Suppose that c 1 ≤ c 1,2 and c 2 ≤ c 2,1 . We can thus draw the following conclusion:
Lemma 5. From Lemma 4, we obtain that the only SPE is the null strategy for the three players, that is the SPE is
(( / 0, / 0), ( / 0, / 0), / 0
) if any of the following condition is satisfied:
• n 1 + n 2 − 1 < k + 1;
In these cases, the SPE also corresponds to the optimal strategy for each of the 3 players.
In the following, we thus focus our attention in situations in which the conditions of Lemma 5 are not satisfied. Furthermore, we denote the set of SPE of the game by L * .
B. Efficiency of the Equilibria
From Lemma 4, at the SPE, the two operators sequentially form an IoT-enabled infrastructure network that is k-connected (if such network can be constructed so that they both receive a positive utility). In this section, we are interested in how different the costs are at the SPE and in a system where both operators can coordinate. We first present the definition of price of anarchy (PoA).
Definition 1 (Price of Anarchy). The PoA for the secure IoTenabled infrastructure network formation game is defined as
PoA = max w∈L * C SPE (w) C SO ,
where C SPE and C SO are the sum of costs for the operators at the SPE network and the sum of costs they would experience with coordination, respectively.
Then, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The PoA of the secure IoT-enabled infrastructure network formation game is unbounded.
Proposition 1 shows that the individual costs as well as the global sum of costs can be arbitrarily different in the SPE and coordinated optimal infrastructure networks.
IV. SECURE MULTI-LAYER NETWORK CONSTRUCTION
With the obtained SPE in Section III-A, the next critical step is to construct the secure IoT-enabled infrastructure networks. In particular, we consider the scenario of n 1 = n 2 . For clarity purposes, we further suppose that n 1 and k are odd numbers.
To construct a k-resistant IoT-enabled infrastructure network, operators 1 and 2 need to jointly create a network that has at least
links. This constitutes a lower bound on the number of links created (in a non-null strategy). Since k is odd, by using Menger's theorem [10] , we propose a construction using a superposition of exactly k+1 2 independent Hamiltonian cycles. The algorithm for the network construction is depicted in Fig. 1 , and for clarity, we decompose it into 4 stages as follows. Thus, for a given value of e 1 , both operators' costs are minimized when |E 1,2 1 | is minimized, that is when operator 1 uses as many links between nodes of N 1 as possible, as long as the sum of degrees of the nodes in N 1 is less than (n 1 − 1)(k + 1). Thus, for a given e 1 ,
Thus, operator 1 chooses the minimal value of e 1 and a set of links such that operator 2 can construct a k-resistant network with a cost lower than 1. Then, operator 1 computes its own resulting cost. If it is higher than 1, then no links are created and the SPE is (( / 0, / 0), ( / 0, / 0), / 0). Otherwise, a network with e 1 links for operator 1 and n 1 (k + 1) − e 1 links for operator 2 is created. First, operator 1 creates links in E 1 in a similar manner as in Harary [11] . That is, it first creates links between nodes i and j such that (|i − j| mod n 1 ) = 1, and then (|i − j| mod n 1 ) = 2, etc. From [12] , we know that a 2m-Harary network contains exactly m independent Hamilton cycles of N 1 , that is cycles that go through all n 1 nodes and such that no link is used more than once. Further, [12] shows that there exists a construction such that links (1; 2), (1; 3) , ..., (1; m−1) all belong to different cycles. Thus, we remove those links from our construction and build all other links of the Harary network. We further construct m(n 1 − 1) links in E 2 which are symmetric to as those in E 1 . Hence, this stage creates 2m(n 1 − 1) links.
Further, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, by constructing two links, one between nodes 1 and n 1 + i + 1 and one between nodes n 1 + 1 and i + 1, we form a Hamiltonian cycle between all nodes in N 1 ∪ N 2 . Note that all m different cycles use independent links. This further creates 2m links in E 1,2 .
Stage 3: (Algorithm, line 21-27) In the case where e 11 > m(n 1 −1), then operator 1 still needs to create z = e 11 −m(n 1 − 1) links in E 1 .
In that case, we create an additional Hamiltonian cycle in the following manner. Starting from node 1, we consider the sequence i 1 ; i 2 ; ...; i n 1 with i 1 = 1 and i j+1 = (i j + (n 1 + 1)/2) mod n 1 . Since n 1 is odd, then for all 1 ≤ j, ℓ ≤ n 1 and j ∕ = ℓ, we have i j ∕ = i ℓ or in other words the sequence i 1 ; i 2 ; ...; i n 1 defines a permutation of indices 1, ..., n 1 . We then consider the following construction: for j ≤ z, we construct the links (i j ; i j+1 ) and (i j + n 1 ; i j+1 + n 1 ) and for z < j < n 1 , we construct the links (i j ; i j+1 + n 1 ) and (i j + n 1 ; i j+1 ). This defines 2 sequences, and each one contains exactly n 1 nodes. By adding links (1; n 1 +1) and ((n 1 + 1)/2; n 1 +(n 1 + 1)/2), we create a full Hamiltonian cycle. Note that none of the links used previously have been created since m < (k + 1)/2. This stage creates exactly either 0 link or 2n 1 = n links among which z links are in E 1 , z links are in E 2 , and n − 2z links are in E 1,2 .
Stage 4: (Algorithm, line 28-31) In total, either m or m + 1 Hamiltonian cycles have been created and e 11 links have been used. We thus create the remaining m 12 Hamiltonian cycles with links exclusively in E 1,2 that have not been created in the previous stages. A possible solution for k < n 1 is as follows. For all t that satisfy m < t < (k + 1)/2, we construct a Hamiltonian cycle following this pattern: for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 , we create links (i; (i +t mod n 1 ) + n 1 ) and ((i +t) mod n 1 + n 1 ; (i + 1) mod n 1 ) in the network.
The above 4 stages of construction yield an equilibrium two-layer secure IoT-enabled infrastructure network. Parameters c 1 , c 2 , c 1,2 , c 2,1 , and odd n 
Input:

V. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we use case studies of IoBT to illustrate the optimal design principles of secure IoT-enabled networks with heterogeneous components. In a battlefield scenario, the unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) execute missions together. To enhance the information transmission quality and situational awareness of each agent in the battlefield, a secure and reliable communication network resistant to malicious attacks is critical.
In the following case studies, we consider n 1 = 9 UAVs and n 2 = 9 UGVs in the two-layer IoBT network. The normalized costs of creating different types of links are as follows: c 1 = , and hence the attacker can compromise at most k = 3 links in the network. Based on Lemma 4, we obtain that, at SPE, the UAV network operator 1 creates 10 interlinks within its own network, and the UGV network operator 2 formulates 10 interlinks as well as 16 intralinks between two layers in the IoBT. Therefore, the equilibrium payoffs for operators 1 and 2 are U * 1 = 5 6 and U * 2 = 1 15 , respectively. Note that the equilibrium IoBT network is a 3-connected network, and thus the attacker is incapable of disconnecting the system even with his best effort. By using the algorithm in Section IV, we construct the solution IoBT network resistant to 3 attacks as shown in Fig. 2. We next investigate the impact of the number of attacks on the adversarial IoBT network formation. Specifically, the link creation costs are the same as those in the previous case study. We vary the attacker's capability k, and the obtained results are shown in Fig. 3. Fig. 3a illustrates the number of formed links of network operators 1 and 2 at the equilibrium IoBT configuration. When the attacker can compromise less than 2 links, the UGV network operator creates sufficient interlinks that connect UAVs and UGVs. Therefore, the utility of UAV network operator is 1. As the number of attacks increases, operator 1 begins to contribute to the network defense because operator 2 alone cannot secure the network with a positive payoff. For 2 ≤ k < 7, operator 1 allocates link resources only within the UAV network. In comparison, operator 2 creates fewer intralinks and allocates more resources in its own UGV network as the cyber threats increase. In addition, when the number of attacks exceeds a certain level, i.e., k ≥ 7 in this case, both network operators will cease to protect the network, and the corresponding SPE is a null strategy which satisfies the second condition in Lemma 5. Fig. 3b shows the utilities of two operators at the equilibrium IoBT network. The operator 1's payoff decreases as k grows. Interestingly, in the regime where the UAV network operator contributes to the secure IoBT network, i.e., 2 ≤ k ≤ 6, the utility of UGV network operator remains the same which corresponds to the maximum effort that operator 2 can use. Based on this case study, we can conclude that higher threat levels induce more collaborations between two network operators.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the multi-layer adversarial network design for the IoT-enabled infrastructures. To secure the heterogeneous components in the infrastructure networks, we have formulated a three-player three-stage network formation game where two network operators aim to keep the network connected in the presence of attacks. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) of the game has been shown to be an empty set when the number of communication links that the attacker can compromise exceeds a threshold, or the link creations are too costly for the operators. The price of anarchy, i.e., the ratio of network formation costs between the SPE and team optimal strategies, of the game is unbounded. Furthermore, with a higher threat level, two network operators are more willing to collaborate to defend against attacks, since one operator alone cannot completely mitigate the threats with a limited amount of link allocation resources. Our future work would investigate the scenario in which network operators can protect the created links with some costs and study its SPE. 
